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Summary/Abstract
My project demonstrates how the Saudi Arabian government established their control
over a dissident Eastern Province. Examining a mixture of ARAMCO, American, and
Saudi sources, my thesis aims to expand the historiography of urban history, Saudi
Arabia, and company towns in the twentieth century. Through the lens of company
towns, urban development, and military modernization, I show how Saudi Arabia was
effectively able to disrupt local power structures and replace them with their own. Urban
development provides an effective tool through which I assess larger trends in the
Saudi-ARAMCO relationship, the ruler-subject relationship, and sedentarization policy
during the 1940s through the 1960s
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1) Introduction/Context
In 1932, King Abdulaziz formally united the emirates of the Arabian Peninsula into the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. By 1947, fifteen years later, the kingdom was unified in name only.
Despite King Abdulaziz's efforts, sectarian differences, primarily ethnic and tribal, continued to
divide the country.1
In order to remedy ethnic divisions and consolidate his power, King Abdulaziz focused
his attempts on national unification through religion. King Abdulaziz’s creation of a national
identity relied on the Saud family’s 1744 alliance with Wahhabist clerics. In this alliance, the
Wahhabist gave the Saudi dynasty a casus belli against all non-Wahhabists. Wahhabism
represents a ultraconservative branch of Islam whose adherents wish to reject millenia of
scholarly interpretations and scholarly interpretations and return to a strict interpretation of the
Qu’ran.2 Wahhabists view other Muslims, including both other Sunnis and Shi’is, as falling
astray from the true interpretation of the Qu’ran. Meanwhile, the al-Saud family agreed to
enforce the doctrine of the Wahhabist clerics, or ulema, within their holdings and spread
Wahhabist influence across the Arabian Peninsula and beyond.3 By the early 20th century, the
Saudi family still maintained this alliance and enforced Wahhabist doctrine.
1.1 Religious and Cultural Divides
Despite their attempts to use religion to unify the country, the Saudi government was
largely unsuccessful early on. By 1947, the Saudi government decided to change their system of
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resource distribution to sway the loyalty of many of their subjects. Ethnic and religious loyalties
largely remained fragmented. Despite King Abdulaziz’s military conquests, the Saud family
faced opposition from all directions. The Saudi family primarily derived their power and support

Map of Saudi Arabia and the provinces 4
from Riyadh and its surrounding lands. To the west, the Saudi family faced the remnants of a
branch of the Hashemites. The Hashemites, a family claiming to be descended from Muhammad,
ruled over Mecca and Medina. In the 1921 Cairo Conference, the British promised the
Hashemite family the rest of the Arabian Peninsula for their support against the Ottoman Empire
in World War One. 5 King Abdulaziz, however, ignored the Cairo Conference and conquered the
Hashemites in 1925. Despite their defeat, the subjects of the Hashemites would resist Saudi rule
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for years after the initial conquest, supported by the neighboring Hashemite kings in Jordan, Iraq,
and Syria.6
In the east of Saudi Arabia, a majority of the original inhabitants descended from the
Rashidi dynasty, the family who the Saud family ousted from power in the early 20th century,
and their subordinate tribes.7 The leadership that survived the conquest of the Arabian Peninsula
often did not cooperate with the Saudi Family, refusing to contribute taxes and soldiers to the
Saudi regime.8
Of these families the Rashidi Dynasty and the Eastern Province (A'Sharqiyah) proved the
most difficult to subdue. The Rashidi’s family control in Eastern Province represented not only
different political aspirations, but also different cultural sensibilities. For example, Hijazis looked
down upon the Nejadis for being “uncivilized”, while the Nejadis thought the Hijazis were soft,
degenerate, and not living up to Qu’ranic ideals.9 Meanwhile, the Baharna people, who reside in
the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia, maintained a separate dialect from most Saudi Arabians,
speaking the Gulf dialect instead of the Najdi dialect.10 While some similarities exist between the
two dialects, the Gulf dialect shares a greater cultural affiliation with other Gulf regions like
Kuwait and Bahrain, while the Najdi dialect represents central Arabian cultures. The linguistic
differences would prove a further obstacle for uniting a non-rebellious population under the
monarchy because the Saudi dialect represented an invasion of a foreign culture into the Baharna
culture.

6
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Furthermore, the subjects in the Eastern Province did not accept Wahhabist rule and
remained religiously separate from the ruling dynasty. With these cultural and religious
differences dividing Saudi Arabia, King Abdulaziz struggled to maintain control of the Eastern
Province.11 While it still remained a part of Saudi Arabia, most internal resistance such as strikes
and protests originated from the Eastern Province. A majority of Saudi Shi’is lived and continue
to live in the Eastern Province. Shiism is an Islamic denomination shunned by Wahhabists
because Wahhabists deny the perfection of the imams and saint worship.12 Additionally,
Wahhabist destroyed Shi’i Mosques and tombs because Wahhabism forbids iconography and
ancestral worship.13 A further source of conflict between the Shi’is and the Saud family comes
from discriminatory policies against Shi’is. The Saud family and the Wahhabist clerics denied
Shiites access to representation and jobs within the government and military, and patronage, yet
many still refused to convert. Government officials would be sent from the home province of the
Saudis, Riyadh and the surrounding Nejd province, to ensure compliance from the Eastern
Province.
In the early 1930s, a lack of funds and a global depression further complicated King
Abdulaziz’s position. Without an income, King Abdulaziz could not effectively control the
disparate parts of his country as he could not afford to pay the salaries of his officials or soldiers.
In 1932 King Abdulaziz sought outside help to bolster the country’s failing economy. Initially, he
turned to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (AIPOC) and offered to give them surveying rights in
Saudi Arabia in exchange for an allowance and eventual percentage of the oil revenue. The
surveyors did not believe surveying Saudi Arabia was a worthwhile endeavour and only offered
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them a pittance. After the failed negotiation with AIPOC, King Abdulaziz began negotiations
with an American oil company, Standard Oil of California. 14 In 1932, Standard Oil signed a
contract with Saudi Arabia for mineral surveying rights.
Saudi Arabia, since the discovery of oil within its borders, has been consistently
influenced by Western nations seeking its material wealth. The history of British colonialism,
however, in Saudi Arabia differs from many of its neighbors because the British government
never directly administered Saudi Arabia as a protectorate. Despite this lack of control, before
1932, Saudi Arabia still existed under British imperial control. John Gallagher and Ronald
Robinson, history professors, introduced the idea of informal empires in 1953. In their essay,
“The Imperialism of Free Trade” they argue that the free market and British capitalism
eventually lead to economic dominance and a system of tributaries loyal to the British empire.
Further drawing from “The Imperialism of Free Trade,” I define an informal empire as a system
of control in which the imperialist nation can influence their subjects without occupying it in
order to secure economic, strategic, or political gain and at the expense of other foreign powers.
Before 1932, Saudi Arabia was a part of Britain’s “informal empire”. During the early
20th century, Britain was able to greatly limit Saudi expansion in the early 20th century and keep
out other foreign powers through a mixture of treaties, military strength, and economic
incentives without ever setting a foot in the country. The British stood to gain both economic
gain (oil) and strategic gain (ports along the Gulf). They were able to influence Saudi policies
through the use of puppet states (Oman and Muscat) as well as economic incentives like
allowances. Finally, this economic influence came at the expense of other foreign powers,
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specifically the United States who were unable to access the oil resources of Saudi Arabia. Due
to this control, Saudi Arabia should be recognized as part of Britain’s “informal empire”.
The agreement between Standard Oil and Saudi Arabia represented a geopolitical shift in
the Middle East. The formalization performed the dual purpose of giving Saudi Arabia American
diplomatic recognition as well as symbolically replacing British-led companies as the primary
ally of Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, The contract served to formalize Standard Oil’s relationship
with the monarchy by importing an oil well and the arrival of foreign engineers in Saudi Arabia.
Finally, Standard Oil created the Arab American Oil Company, or ARAMCO, as its Saudi
Arabian subsidiary.
The United States never gained informal control of Saudi Arabia because the strategic
and economic benefits of controlling Saudi Arabia largely filtered to ARAMCO executives and
Saudi royalty rather than to the United States. ARAMCO collaborated with the Saudi Arabian
government rather than strictly exploiting them. For example during the Buraimi Dispute of
1953, a border clash between Saudi Arabia and British-administered Oman, ARAMCO provided
aerial surveillance, legal assistance, and armored vehicles to the Saudi Arabian government. 15 An
expansion of Saudi Arabia benefitted not only Saudi Arabia, but also ARAMCO because it
expanded the area where they could survey and drill for oil. It was also something the United
States government showed itself unwilling to support, even going so far as to publicly declare
their support for British presence in Saudi Arabia. 16
The dynamic of the relationship between Saudi Arabia, ARAMCO, and the United
States is important to define because it helps frame the reasons for why the United States would

15

Michael Quentin Morton, Buraimi: The Struggle for Power, Influence, and Oil in Arabia, (London, I.B.
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be willing to sell arms and provide military aid to Saudi Arabia, even if Saudi Arabia was not a
part of America’s formal or informal empire.

Area of Study in Relation to Each Other and to British-controlled Bahrain17
Three years later, ARAMCO engineers found oil in the Eastern Province of Saudi
Arabia.18 By 1950, oil revenues accounted for an increase of a 100 million dollars in state
revenue over 1938’s state revenue.19 1950 also marked the beginning of an equal profit sharing
agreement. In November of 1950, Saudi Arabia and ARAMCO had agreed to split the profits
equally between themselves rather than ARAMCO granting Saudi Arabia an annual allowance.
Furthermore, ARAMCO agreed to hire more Saudi Arabians and Palestinians in the wake of the
1948 Palestinian War at the behest of King Abdulaziz. This economic relationship also
manifested itself in a physical presence.
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In 1947, ARAMCO and its employees became involved with the urban planning of
Al-Khobar and Dhahran, cities in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia, warping the pre-existing
structures of the city.20 While Dhahran had around 7,000 in 1950, it grew to 35,000 people by
1960, many of these new residents Western and non-local Saudis.21 These Saudi Arabians, loyal
to the crown, primarily came from the Nejd region including the capital city of Riyadh.
The majority Shi’i people of the Eastern Province often faced forced resettlement and
destruction of their historic home lands which would then be replaced with Mediterranean-style
villas (see link).22 Effectively building a city within a city, ARAMCO destroyed older Arabian
homes and familial spaces to make way for new streets, Mediterranean villas, and public spaces.
To further emphasize the divide between ARAMCO and Saudi Arabians, ARAMCO built a
concrete wall between its compound, intended for the Western workers and segregated by race,
and the surrounding city, made of Saudi Arabians. Both ARAMCO and Saudi Arabia encouraged

American Camp in Dhahran 1950s23
20
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the physical division of Saudi subjects and foreign workers because ARAMCO believed it could
drive down labor costs by segregating its white employees, while Saudi Arabia did not want to
reward workers from the Eastern Province with improved housing, services, and jobs.24
By the 1950s, however, this policy of segregation would reverse and local workers would
be invited in as Saudi Arabians from the “loyal provinces” (like the Nejd, where the Saud’s
powerbase originated) immigrated to the Eastern Province. Unravelling why and how ARAMCO
and the Saudi Arabian government favored policies of integration, urbanization, and immigration
are critical to understanding Saudi control in the Eastern Province.

24

Robert Vitalis, America's Kingdom: Mythmaking on the Saudi Oil Frontier, (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 2005), 21.
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2) Problem Construction
My research will study the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia between 1947-1969 to better
understand how the Saudi Arabian government established their control over the Eastern
Province through the usage of company towns, urbanization, and the development of institutions.
The case study of Dhahran, the city where ARAMCO chose to place its Saudi headquarters, and
its surrounding cities will show how company towns became a model for dominating the
Baharna people of the Eastern Province. Through the usage of military policing, forced
immigration and emigration, and the creation of centralized infrastructure and transportation
links, the monarchy attempted to replace tribal sympathies with monarchal loyalties.
As Saudi Arabia extended and solidified its power in the Eastern Province, the
government’s system of resource distribution changed. Instead of directly giving patronage to
tribal leaders in order to control their members, Saudi Arabia began distributing resources
directly to its subjects via housing, utilities, and transportation links in order to shift their loyalty
from tribal to national.
Looking at company towns in Saudi Arabia also raises other smaller questions that
illuminate hidden aspects of Saudi development.
● How did Saudi Arabians resist, accept, or subvert ideas of joint ARAMCO-Saudi
urbanization projects?
● To what extent did the exportation of American values abroad succeed
● To what extent was the relationship between Saudi Arabia and ARAMCO coloniali

10

2.1 Saudi Arabian Literature Review
While the last question about understanding the ARAMCO-Saudi Arabian relationship
may seem secondary to my research question, the connection between the two is essential. The
relationship between the different actors determines our understanding of why Saudi Arabia
developed certain projects or programs. Was the Saudi Arabian government the victim of a
neo-colonial conquest by ARAMCO and the United States government? Or did the monarchy
assert themselves in the relationship and make deliberate choices in order to exert control over
their subjects?
Preliminarily, I find evidence to challenge the narrative of company towns as a wholly
colonialist endeavour in Saudi Arabia as advocated by Robert Vitalis, a political scientist
studying oil and the Middle East. Vitalis argues that Saudi independence during the early half of
the 20th century was a myth created by ARAMCO to hide their exploitation of Saudi Arabia. 25
Instead, I argue Saudi Arabia and ARAMCO’s relationship was in fact collaborative because
ARAMCO showed itself willing to disobey American government policy, like when ARAMCO
halted the construction of American governmental oil reserves in Saudi Arabia in 1944. Rather
than allowing for the creation of a strategic oil reserve for the United States, ARAMCO’s
lobbying and internal connections led to the continued ownership of the oil by their private
group. ARAMCO’s control of the oil primarily led to the growth of their private wealth rather
than the oil becoming a strategic asset for the United States.26
ARAMCO worked with Saudi officials to keep as much wealth in the hands of
ARAMCO executives and Saudi royalty. This can be seen in ARAMCO’s petitioning for

25
26

Vitalis, America's Kingdom: 10
Anthony Cave Brown, Oil, God, and Gold, (New York: Houghton Mifflin 1999), 11.
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American foreign aid to Saudi Arabia. 27 Rather than paying from their own pockets, ARAMCO
used American taxpayer dollars to cover Saudi deficits. ARAMCO’s ability to manipulate
congressional funds and policy for their own gain shows the company’s autonomy from
American policy.
Rather than establishing a colonial arm of the United States, ARAMCO attempted to
foster a culture of kleptocracy, a system where the ruling class would attempt to extract as much
wealth from their subjects as possible for personal gain, as the means to best enrich themselves.
Furthermore, the Saudi-ARAMCO relationship is different from other Middle Eastern countries
with their colonial rulers for two additional reasons. First, ARAMCO was not state controlled
and thus could exert the same political dominance that the British or American government
could.28 Second, Britain granted Saudi Arabia recognition and independence long before any
other Middle Eastern nation.29 Independence from the British government allowed them the
freedom to negotiate with other Western powers which granted them a stronger bargaining
position than other Middle Eastern countries who were forced to obey British-imposed
administration.
Two trends dominating ARAMCO-Saudi scholarship provide scholars different ways of
understanding how the monarchy and ARAMCO interacted. The first school of thought argues
for a Western-dominated Saudi Arabia. Historians like Irvine Anderson argue that Saudi Arabia’s
lack of state capacity until the early 1950s led them to become effectively another colony in the
Middle East, albeit American-controlled and not British. 30 Instead, it was ineffectual American
policies and a desire to secure allies in the Middle East during the Cold War that led to more
27

Robert Vitalis, “Black Gold, White Crude: An Essay on American Exceptionalism, Hierarchy, and
Hegemony in the Gulf”, Diplomatic History 26, no. 2, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 196.
28
Alexei Vassiliev, The History of Saudi Arabia, (London: Saqi Books, 1998) 333.
29
Al-Rasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia, 14
30
Anderson, ARAMCO, X
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equitable trade concessions. In the same body of literature, Robert Vitalis, a political scientist,
argues that Saudi statesmanship and independence during this period is a myth.31 Saudi Arabia,
he argues, was another imperialist puppet and ARAMCO was simply an extension of the
American government.
Other scholars from the Saudi-ARAMCO body of literature argue for the importance of
Saudi independence and Saudi statesmanship. Scholars like Madawi al-Rasheed, a leading
scholar on Saudi Arabian history and anthropology, argue Saudi independence led to SOCAL’s
(ARAMCO’s predecessor) ability to negotiate with King Abdulaziz without British
intervention.32 Without their independence, granted in 1927, the British would insert a
state-controlled administration into Saudi Arabian government as evidenced by their neighbors
in Kuwait, Iran, and Bahrain.
Another historian Reem Alissa, a specialist in urban development and oil in the Middle
East, disagrees with Vitalis about the ineffectuality of Saudi state capacity. Alissa instead credits
King Abdulaziz’s statesmanship for his ability to play American and British interests off each
other to insure more equal deals for Saudi Arabia. 33 Similar to how King Abdulaziz turned from
the British state-run petroleum companies in order to negotiate better oil concessions, Alissa
demonstrates how the Saudi royalty renegotiated better oil concessions through their
participation in OPEC.34
Both Alissa and Al-Rasheed represent a newer wave of Arab historians who are
reinserting an Arab voice into the Saudi Arabian historiography. While an older generation like
Vitalis tend to represent western scholars who argue for an impotent Arab state, Rasheed and the
31
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other Arab scholars argue that while there was inequality between the West and Saudi Arabia,
Saudi Arabia made the best of a bad situation and managed to extract wealth, knowledge, and
concessions that other nations did not.
I intervene into the Saudi Arabian historiography by arguing that while ARAMCO at
times was exploitative, they primarily acted collaboratively with the Saudi royal family seperate
from the interests of the United States government. ARAMCO’s interests and the Saudi
government’s interests aligned much more frequently than ARAMCO’s interest and the
American government’s interest. American interests were primarily to secure a cheap source of
oil for both domestic and military matters, whereas ARAMCO sought to earn the highest profit
possible. The symbiotic relation between ARAMCO and Saudi Arabia became essential to both
of their continued existences.
While there was certainly American government intervention, as Vitalis and Anderson
argue, into Saudi Arabia-ARAMCO affairs, ARAMCO and Saudi Arabia had a vested interest in
ensuring as little interference as possible from the American government. In particular,
ARAMCO desired to sell their oil for the best price possible. While this often meant selling to
the United States, this was not always the case and ARAMCO fought to ensure their freedom to
sell to the highest buyer. Vitalis undersells the state capacity of Saudi Arabia often crediting
ARAMCO for any change (positive or negative) in Saudi Arabia, whilst Alissa exaggerates King
Saud’s statesmanship. Instead, a blend of conflicting American interests combined with Saudi
independence led to more equitable trade concessions for Saudi Arabia and a more equal
relationship with ARAMCO than other nations shared with foreign oil companies. The monarchy
fought to maintain as much independence as possible and they wanted to ensure a weaker trade
partner in order to receive more favorable contracts.

14

Meanwhile ARAMCO wanted to avoid losing their monopoly to smaller American oil
companies as well as to an American-led national oil company, the Petroleum Reserve Company
(PRC). The PRC was an initiative created during the Cold War by the Secretary of the Navy to
protect American strategic interests and to provide oil to the American military. 35 The company
would have replaced ARAMCO and in supplying the U.S. military only would have lost out on a
significant amount of income as there would be no competition to shape prices. Without
aggressive lobbying from the oil industry, Saudi Arabia’s oil would have become directly
administered by the government (via the PRC) as its neighbors were and ARAMCO would have
lost its source of wealth. This delicate balance of being able to beholden to the United States
government while also being able to influence it, pushed ARAMCO and Saudi Arabia closer
together.
This thesis will demonstrate how the Saud dynasty worked with ARAMCO to adopt the
model of company towns across the country as a means to unify Saudi Arabia and suppress their
political and religious dissidents. Company towns were not the result of Saudi submission to
colonialism, but because Saudi Arabia needed systems of institutional control and ARAMCO
employees expected Western accommodations.
Systems of control for Saudi Arabia meant a way to control the Eastern Province other
than through state violence and threats. In this thesis, I argue the Saudi government wanted to
subdue the Baharna population by resettling outsiders and Nejadi Saudis, who were more loyal
to the throne, and outnumbering the native population.
Finally, the main divide between Saudi acceptance or rejection of American
development, depended on the subject’s relationship to the Saud family. Members of the royal
family, their close supporters and government officials tended to accept Western development
35
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because it benefited them, whereas those unaffiliated or opposed to the Saud family tended to
reject Western ideas either out of rejection of Saudi control or because these groups found the
Western styles odd and discomforting.36 Mashary Al-Naim, a scholar of architectural history,
argues that some Saudi residents rejected concrete and relied on traditional materials like mud in
order to show their opposition to the modernization and westernization of Saudi Arabia. 37

36

Faisail A. Mubarak, “Urban Growth Boundary Policy and Residential Suburbanization: Riyadh, Saudi
Arabia,” in Habitat International 28, (Amsterdam: Elsvier Ltd, 2004) 575.
37
Mashary A. Al-Naim, “The Oil Town of Ahmadi since 1946: From Colonial Town to Nostalgic City”
International Journal of Architectural Research 2, no. 2 (Bingley UK: Emerald Publishing, 2008) 125
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3) Primary Sources
My project will draw primarily from the United States State Department Archives
(American and Saudi) as well as private records from ARAMCO found in ARAMCO’s digital
archives. Ideally, I would be able to draw primarily from Saudi archives. However without
personal access to Saudi Arabia, it would be near impossible to rely primarily on sources from
Saudi Arabia due to censorship policies, current COVID-19 restrictions, and a lack of
digitization.
One limitation of this project is the limited access to Saudi Arabian archives. Many of the
accessible Saudi government records that do exist in the United States can be found in
Georgetown University’s library in the Arab and Middle East section. During COVID-19,
however, there was no access to these resources digitally despite social distancing policies. If I
were to do the project in a non-pandemic year, I would access these documents and use them.The
sources found at the Georgetown library may reveal: to what extent did the Saudi government
and ARAMCO actually work together, what reservations did the Saudi government have about
working with ARAMCO, and how did Saudi Arabian view the relationship between themselves
and ARAMCO?
The first contribution of this paper is the study of primary sources from ARAMCO.
These sources include both their publication, ARAMCO World as well as internal business
documents such as employee counts and loan documentation. During the 1930s through the
1950s, ARAMCO became heavily involved in Saudi Arabian affairs and kept extensive records
of their negotiations and dealings that are now (partially) public. In particular, one can look at

17

ARAMCO World, ARAMCO’s publication during this time period to understand the dynamics
of day to day life for an ARAMCO worker. Furthermore, the University of Mississippi has
access to the ARAMCO handbook, which details the development of Dhahran as well as the
social life of ARAMCO workers during the 1960s. These sources help me explore questions
such as: how often did these two groups work together, if this relationship did change, at what
point did Saudi workers and foreign workers begin to work more closely together and why, and
how did publications talk about and treat Saudi workers. Furthermore, while these documents
have been used before to document the American imperialism in the region, I will be examining
these documents with the new lens of Saudi Arabian state capability and development.These
questions will help me answer how the Saudi government and ARAMCO used immigration and
segregation to exercise control in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia.
My major contribution to the Saudi Arabian historiography comes from my analysis of
the O’Keefe report. The O’Keefe Report is a diplomatic correspondence between the diplomatic
mission to Saudi Arabia and the D.C. branch of the State Department regarding the protection of
Saudi Arabia. While this report has been used before, it is primarily the purview of military
historians examining the evolution of the military in Saudi Arabia or looking at Saudi
militarization in the context of the Cold War. My paper examines the O’Keefe report through the
lens of domestic control and subjugation rather than from an international geo-political
understanding.
Finally, I will look at the contracts signed between Saudi Arabia and ARAMCO. The
shifts in the material benefits of the contract between Saudi Arabia and ARAMCO will help
illustrate the changing power dynamic between the two groups. A textual analysis may reveal
changes in language and rhetoric that may also subtly highlight this same power dynamic.

18

Textual analysis also reveals certain clauses that help demonstrate how King Abdulaziz used
ARAMCO to further support his control of the Eastern Province. These contracts are available
online and will become a key part of my project moving forward.
Using these aforementioned primary sources, I will examine Saudi consolidation of
power in the Eastern Province. In the first section, I will examine how Saudi Arabia used
transportation links to sedentarize the local bedouin population. The following section examines
how Saudi Arabia’s creation of home ownership and suburbia led to the destabilization of tribal
power structures. The final section demonstrates how Saudi Arabia’s military modernization was
primarily designed to deal with internal threats and prevent coups rather than defend against
external invasion.

19

4) Rebels and Railways: Transportation and Sedentarization in the Eastern Province
4. 1 Introduction
Infrastructure projects from the 1930s through the 1950s played essential roles in the
consolidation of Saudi Arabian government’s power in the Eastern Province. King Abdulaziz’s
authority over the Eastern Province suffered from dissent and disunity following its unification
in the 1920s. In addition to the presence of the rival Rashidi dynasty, the Saudi royal family also
faced challenges from bedouin tribes in the Eastern Province who did not obey Saudi rule.
Without patronage from the government, bedouin tribes in the Eastern Province would raid Saudi
supply lines and disrupt Saudi commercial activities in the region.38 In the 1930s, the government
distributed money from the oil concession among tribal leaders in the Eastern Province in
exchange for their compliance. This system of direct patronage allowed for the temporary
pacification of tribes across Saudi Arabia. 39 Saudi Arabia in the late 1930s needed a way to strip
the local leaders of their followings and create Saudi loyalists.
It is clear from the evidence that King Abdulaziz, however, did not believe that direct
patronage to leaders would be a long-term solution to establishing power in the Eastern Province.
Instead, King Abdulaziz’s push for large-scale infrastructure projects led to greater immigration
to the area from Saudi-loyal areas, leading to greater Saudi control of the Eastern Province. As
demonstrated in the following sections, King Abdulaziz purposefully created infrastructural
projects that led to an increased number of Riyadh-based Saudis living in the Eastern Province,
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thus shifting the balance of power from the Eastern Province/Baharna people to the Nejdi/Saudi
supporters. Besides the benefit of immigration, I argue the large-scale projects created jobs
which sedentarized the bedouin population, making them more dependent on Saudi services and
governance. ARAMCO’s experience in both design and construction combined with King
Abdulaziz (and the rest of the royal family’s) desire to control the Eastern Province
fundamentally changed the development of Saudi Arabia.
In the late 1940s, even after the discovery of oil, Saudi Arabia still faced challenges to
their authority from the Eastern Province. With the commercial production of oil in 1947 and the
profit-sharing agreement of 1950, the Saudi monarchy began making enough money to shift their
strategy from a system of direct patronage to an indirect system more akin to the rentier state.
During this time period, Saudi Arabia invested in and used ARAMCO institutions to pacify the
Eastern Province, shifting power from local leaders to themselves.
Saudi and ARAMCO’s initiatives-- such as increasing education of Saudi Arabian
citizens, improving infrastructure and, most importantly, creating transportation links-- helped
sedentarize the Eastern province and consolidated Saudi power in the Eastern Province.
ARAMCO and Saudi Arabia’s investment into the Eastern Province effectively pacified the
region by shifting local reliance from bedouin leaders to Saudi governmental jobs and
institutions.
Some scholars, like Robert Vitalis also argue the rail line provided little economic or
political value to Saudi Arabia and showed King Abdulaziz’s ineptitude in ruling Saudi Arabia. 40
Vitalis contends that railways in Saudi Arabia were a vanity project; an antiquated idea for the
king where instead the funds should have been used to improve the highway infrastructure to
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transport goods between Riyadh and Dhahran.41 In theory, highways could achieve the same
effects as a rail way: migration, and sedentarization. As demonstrated below, railways proved to
be a more effective tool to maintain state authority because it allowed for the control of Saudi
subjects.
Robert Vitalis arguesthat ARAMCO primarily built institutions as a means to more
effectively exert control and extract wealth without Saudi elite approval.42 Many of these
projects, however, extended Saudi Arabian control of the region and disrupted traditional and
tribal sources of power in the province. Looking at programs like the construction of
transportation links between Riyadh and Dammam shows how effective the Saudi government
was at destabilizing their opposition.
In the original oil concession between ARAMCO and Saudi Arabia, it was “[...] distinctly
understood that the Company (ARAMCO) or anyone connected with it shall have no right to
interfere with the administrative, political, or religious affairs within Saudi Arabia.” 43 Despite
this claim, one can see that ARAMCO as demonstrated in the following section, especially
between the 1930s and late 1950s, largely became intertwined with the urban development of the
Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia. As ARAMCO became increasingly invested in Saudi Arabia,
the Saudi ruling family used ARAMCO as a tool to sedentarize problematic bedouin groups who
opposed Saudi rule.
The creation of the Riyadh-Dammam line in 1947 acted as both a tool and active symbol
of King Abdulaziz’s modernization and sedentarization policies for the Eastern Province. The
rail line allowed for greater Saudi consolidation of power because it empowered greater
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migration between Riyadh and the Eastern Province, created jobs that sedentarized the Eastern
Province population and enhanced the movement of military and paramilitary forces between the
capital and Dhahran.
4.2 Railways Bring Shifting Loyalties: Migrants Destabilize Tribal Structures
The most significant impact of the Dhahran rail line was its migrational pull. Originally
designed to transport goods from Riyadh to Dhahran, the rail line eventually began transporting
passengers between the two regions as well.44 In addition to the ability to migrate more easily,
however, the jobs created by both the oil extraction and the railway began to produce jobs and
provide training.45 The new jobs motivated people to leave their homes and move to the Eastern
Province. Increased migration into the previously untamed Eastern Province would create a
power base for King Abdulaziz to begin integrating the region into his control. Without the
railway, however, Riyadh subjects would be forced to cross the Empty Quarter, a stretch of
desert renowned for its inhospitable, slowing down both the speed and willingness of people
wanting to migrate. In creating a railway, King Abdulaziz overcame the barrier of the Empty
Quarter and extended his authority outside of the confines of Riyadh and the surrounding Nejd
lands. Eastern Saudi Arabians who were not pacified by the new jobs and elites would face the
threat of rapidly transportable paramilitary soldiers.
King Abdulaziz was not the first, however, to employ railways as a means to control.
Isma’il Pasha, the khedive of Egypt, also attempted to use technology and infrastructure as a
means of control.46 Encouraged by French plantation owners, Khedive Isma’il built railroads in
the Qina Province. Much like the Saudi railway, built over half a century later, the railway served
44
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a dual purpose. Isma’il Pasha not only appeased the French plantation owners, major players in
his modernizing economy, but he also was able to effectively extend his control from Cairo, the
capital, to a more southern region of Egypt.47 In particular, Khedive Pasha transported thousands
of conscripts to help him complete his infrastructural projects as well as import garrisons to
watch over workers.48 Rather than relying on semi-autonomous governors, Khedive Pasha could
directly manage the southern region and quell any resistance to his modernization and
liberalization of both economic and social policy. While Khedive Pasha’s policies ultimately
failed due to British interference and an overextension of Egyptian capital, the historical parallel
establishes the usage of railways as more than just a system of transportation and commerce, but
as an effective system of control.49
Rather than relying solely on military occupation, King Abdulaziz attempted to garner
support in the Eastern Province by creating economic uplift. As figure one (see below) shows,
the number of Saudi employees at ARAMCO increased by fifty percent after the start of
construction of the railroad in 1947 from about 8,000 to 12,000. The immediate increase in the
workforce (in the absence of reliable population data) shows that not only were there more Saudi
subjects moving to the Eastern Province, but there was an increase in educational and economic
opportunities. While data doesn't exist before1962, the 1962 census estimates that the population
of nomadic and semi-nomadic people had shifted from roughly 70% in 1950 to about 50% in
1962.50 It is therefore safe to assume that the implementation of urbanization in the Eastern
Province and the rest of Saudi Arabia was largely a success. Rather than being stuck as a farmer
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Number of Saudi Arabian Employees of ARAMCO (1935-1957) 51
Year

# of Saudi
Arabians
Employees

Year

# of Saudi
Arabians
Employees

1935

120

1947

12000

1936

1100

1948

12200

1937

550

1949

10000

1938

2700

1950

10800

1939

3200

1951

13800

1940

2700

1952

14800

1941

1600

1953

13600

1942

1700

1954

14200

1943

2700

1955

13400

1944

7400

1956

13200

1945

8100

1957

12800

1946

7300
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or a herder, Dammam and the Eastern Province provided an opportunity for some degree of
economic and social uplift.
Looking at ARAMCO employment reports, opportunities increased in the Eastern
Province. ARAMCO established several training centers for Saudi citizens to not only become
laborers, but skilled workers in the refinery.52 Job training and a steady job lured Eastern
Province residents from their formal tribal allegiances to King Abdulaziz’s control. ARAMCO’s
lure of wealth and opportunity led to the continuing trend of increased Saudi migration and
settlement all the way into the 1980s when ARAMCO became nationalized by the Saudi
government.
The Saudi Arabian monarchy, however, did not grant economic opportunity to all its
subjects equally. King Abdulaziz directed ARAMCO to only employ the oppositional Shi’i
population to menial jobs, whereas the migratory Nejdi-Saudis would have the opportunity to go
to training facilities and access to better jobs.53 At a superficial level, Abdulaziz’s segregation
makes sense as a tale of revenge. A closer examination, however, reveals how Abdulaziz’s
policies served to not only cement his political power in the region, but also appease ARAMCO
interests.
4.3 Segregation in the Eastern Province: Creating a New Urban Elite
King Abdulaziz’s pacification of the Eastern Province goes far beyond simply building a
railway. His policies of unequal opportunities for Saudi loyalists played an essential role in the
extension of Saudi Power in Dhahran and the surrounding province. Specifically, the Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia’s concession of menial jobs would begin indebting the Shi’i population to the
monarchy and begin removing them from the influence of their tribal leaders. After all, the Shi’i
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population could not simultaneously keep the job in the city and stay with their tribe roaming.
Thus, the menial jobs given to Shi’is allowed King Abdulaziz to focus his policing in a contained
urban environment rather than spread his paramilitary forces across an expansive desert and
countryside.
Second, the King’s segregation prevented the Shi’i population from gaining too much
power. By granting elite positions only to Saud dynasty supporters, King Abdulaziz ensured only
his supporters would have access to increased resources and power in the Eastern Province.
Furthermore, their new wealth and position would help destabilize former tribal power structures
that favored Shi’i leaders in the Eastern Province.
The effects of replacing the elite can be seen in 1953 when protests against ARAMCO
were effectively led by Saudi supporters.54 In replacing the elite, King Abdulaziz turned a
potential anti-monarchist protest into simply a labor protest. By reframing protests from an issue
of loyalty into an issue of welfare, these protests show the efficacy of the Saudi Arabian
migrational policy.
This destabilization was critically important because King Abdulaziz (and the larger
Saudi government) was able to get ahead of any revolution or secession in the Eastern Province
before it happened. Rather than worrying about issues of authority stemming from bedouin tribes
and elites rising against him, the monarchy only had to deal with issues of patronage and
resource distribution from their supporters. Railways played an essential role in replacing the
existing power structures around Dhahran and Dammam.
I also posit a tertiary benefit of urbanizing the Shi’i population in Dhahran was the
creation of a reason for enhanced Saudi military forces in the Eastern Province. By settling the
Shi’i population close to the ARAMCO workers, King Abdulaziz would be able to increase the
54

Al-Rasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia, 97.

27

number of police officers in the Eastern Province with lesser backlash. The pretext would be to
keep the the non-Muslim American emploees away from the faithful Saudi subjects, but in
reality it was simply to increase surveillance and dominance of the Shi’i population in the
Eastern Province.
Again looking at labor protests in the 1950s and 1960s, one can see that the Saudi
government heavily relied on the National Guard, their paramilitary police force, to break up
strikes and deal with dissidents.55 What is particularly striking about the use of the National
Guard is that they were almost entirely composed of Najdi tribesmen and Saudi loyalists.56 In
addition to importing Najdi workers into the Eastern Province to disrupt the power of the
Baharna people, King Abdulaziz made sure his strike-breakers responded to him and him alone.
The Guard played a crucial role in not only containing the aforementioned labor strikes, but also
disrupting military plots by officers (from other branches) in the Eastern Province.57 Without the
use of the railway, the king would have had much greater difficulty extending his control beyond
the Najd region.
Finally, King Abdulaziz petitioned for segregation because he knew that it was already
part of ARAMCO policy. In the early part of the 1940s, ARAMCO purposefully built a
perimeter around the American part of the base using barbed wire and fences.58 ARAMCO
management did not want its employees to intermingle with the local population nor did they
want to give Saudi subjects access to the amenities of the American camp. Instead, they wanted
to maintain a continuous source of labor with as little overhead as they could manage. King
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Abdulaziz was more than willing to oblige, so long as they particularly targeted Eastern Province
locals.
In practice, ARAMCO’s discrimination resulted in the preferential jobs, homes, and
services being given to Najdi workers and Palestinians (who King Abdulaziz sheltered after the
1949 Armistice Agreements) over the local Baharna people. Najdis could participate in a
home-loan program from ARAMCO that would allow them to build new homes in the Eastern
Province creating another layer of permanency to their migration. Furthemore, Najdi would
receive better training and would be allowed to travel outside of the country for study and job
training.59
In practice, however, a railway proved to be a better option early on for Saudi Arabia
because of the degree of control railways have over highways. Individuals can only ride on the
railway and cannot control it. The government could effectively control where and when people
and goods were transported. If there was ever a period of insurrection in the Eastern Province,
only the government would have access to a railway which could bypass terrain, carry larger
loads, and travel faster than other traditional transportation. Access to cars would effectively
democratize transportation and migration at a time when the Saudi Arabian ruling family was not
prepared to grant the privilege of movement. Railroads during the 1950s acted as a form of
cultural and political dominance.
Not all scholars agree that railways acted as a tool of socially homogeneous unifier. On
Barak, a Middle Eastern historian, argues against the idea of railways as a homogenizing force in
the Middle East.60 Barak’s main focus in On Time, examines how modern technologies shifted
Egyptian’s perception of time and created “counter-tempos'' or alternative forms of timekeeping
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as a means to protest British colonialism. Barak also goes on to posit, specifically, how railroads
actually acted as a means to create anti-colonialist, anti-capitalist, and anti-authoritarian
sentiments in Egypt.
While Barak’s book does an excellent job proving his thesis in Egypt, I would argue for a
different interpretation in Saudi Arabia. The Saudi Arabian conflict did not represent a struggle
between Europeans and Arabs, but rather between two seperate groups of Saudi Arabians, the
Baharna people of the East and the Nejdi people in Riyadh. As such, the Railways acted as a
weapon and vehicle for King Abdulaziz’s strategy of subjugating ethnic and tribal identities to a
singular national identity. ARAMCO may have represented an alien and distorting presence to
Baharna culture, but it seems the Baharna people were much more wary of the monarchy.
While there were eventual demonstrations against ARAMCO, the protestors were
primarily seeking an improvement in labor rights.61 Concessions were only made when Nejdi
workers also began agitating for improved working conditions.62 The lack of anti-colonial
protests and suppression of Baharna rights show the effectiveness of the railways in both
suppressing and replacing extra-Saudi loyalties. Either through the threat of violence, the
increased number of Saudi loyalists, or the replacement of the oppositional elite, King Abdulaziz
and his railway managed to increase his authority in the Eastern Province. Without the railways
the sedentarization and extension of authority in Dhahran would not have been nearly as
successful. Railways and infrastructure, while important, were not the only other agent of
sedentarization in Saudi Arabia. In addition to the creation of transportation links, King
Abdulaziz began creating homes in order to further encourage a demographic shift in the Eastern
Province.
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5) New Neighbors in the Eastern Province: Using Suburbia to Shift Demographics
5.1. Introduction
The creation of single family homes and the introduction of the suburb in Saudi Arabia
fundamentally shifted the proportions of the nomadic and urban populations in the country.
While infrastructure projects, transportation, and military control all helped create various
avenues for control for the Saudi Arabian government over its subjects, home ownership also
created a greater dependency on the kingdom. In essence, Saudi Arabia wanted to shift how they
gained their subject’s loyalty. Rather than relying on direct patronage (i.e. providing tribal
leaders with cash and gifts), the Saudi royalty wanted to provide their subjects with services and
utility in order to more directly influence the population of the country.
Much like the usage of the railway in Saudi Arabia, the creation of suburbs in company
towns in the Middle East served a dual purpose. First, it benefitted ARAMCO because company
towns helped sedentarism Eastern Province workers around job sites, creating a pool of cheap
labor near the oil fields.
Second, the creation of new homes and increasing homeownership helped further the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’s control over its subjects because it partially succeeded in breaking
down tribal structures and replacing it with a nuclear family.63 Previously before the ascension of
the Saudi family, most people's loyalties remained with their extended families in nomadic or
semi-nomadic tribes.64 By replacing tribal structures with western family structures, Saudi
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Arabia moved closer to creating a national identity where loyalty to the crown came first and
tribal loyalties were destroyed.65 The push to shift tribal loyalties to Saudi loyalties can also be
seen through religious discourse during the early 1950s and beyond. 66
Finally, the United States also had a vested interest in establishing homeownership in
Saudi Arabia. Not only did they want to see ARAMCO succeed and help secure America’s
energy future, but the United States also wanted to create a capitalist ally in the Middle East. In
the context of the Cold War, America wanted to secure allies in the Middle East who would
provide a buffer against Egypt, who angered American policymakers after a 1955 arms deal with
the Soviet Union.67 The United States believed the “conservative” monarchies that relied heavily
on religious and historical traditions would be less likely to support communism and instead
align themselves with the United State. By providing them with loans and material support, the
American government hoped to create a sphere of influence in the Middle East.
5.2. Literature Review of American Urban Historiography
Immigration and resettlement played a crucial part in establishing the monarchy’s control
over the Eastern Province. One useful lens originating from outside of the Middle Eastern urban
historiography comes from William Cronon’s Nature's Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West.
In Cronon’s book, he argues for the symbiotic relationship between city and hinterland, the
“natural” world and resources that the city exploits.68 Cronon argues that as one of these two
locations grow and develop, the other grows with it. The concept of the codirectional relationship
of wealth and development between hinterland and city, provides a useful lens to examine the
relationship between Dhahran and the surrounding oil fields and native population.
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Using Cronon’s framework, I argue the hinterland-city paradigm is critical to
understanding ARAMCO-Saudi development policy. As ARAMCO becomes richer and expands
their presence in Dhahran, they become more invested in the Eastern Province. This leads to
greater development of not just the city, but the surrounding areas in order to facilitate greater
extraction of wealth as well as greater population control to prevent resistance and ensure a
steady supply of unskilled labor. Without examining the “hinterlands” of Dhahran, scholars miss
a complete understanding of developmental policy in Saudi Arabia.
Cronon’s framework also helps illuminate the intertwining of Saudi and ARAMCO goals.
I contend that as ARAMCO and Saudi Arabia begin seeing real gains in state revenue, their goal
to extract wealth unifies the two groups and results in a collaborative relationship. This can most
clearly be seen in their treatment of the local Bedouin tribes. The Bedouin of Eastern Province,
historically owned parts of these oil fields and were known to raid caravans.69 To continue
extracting oil as efficiently as possible and avoid disruptions to the flow of oil, the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia and ARAMCO decided to resettle, by force if necessary, as much of the Bedouin
population as they could to avoid unnecessary future conflict.
Building off Cronon’s framework, Andrew Needham shows in Power Lines: Phoenix and
the Making of the Modern Southwest that despite the symbiotic relationship of development
between hinterlands and city, the resulting benefits of consequences were unevenly distributed
among the various demographics. While the Americans of ARAMCO and the Arabians in
Riyadh garnered much of the wealth from the oil, the Bedouins benefitted little and suffered
greatly. Much like the Navajo nation in Power Lines after the construction of the Boulder Dam,
the Bedouin tribes of the Eastern Province, who were historically enemies, were forced to
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amalgamate into a singular group due to the construction of oil wells and forced resettlement.70
Furthermore, the jobs being offered in the region were given to migrants from central Arabia
rather than to the natives71. Bedouins, like the Navajo people, were displaced and exploited
without any economic or political returns. Needham’s framework helps illustrate how different
groups living within the same geographic region can experience development differently and
provides a framework to help answer my subquestion of resistance to development.
5.3. Literature Review of American Housing Abroad
In addition to Needham and Cronon’s work on hinterlands and cities, other American
authors offer key insights into ideas of homeownership and the exportation of American ideals.
Nancy Kwak, a transnational urban historian, argues the United States began exporting the idea
of home ownership as citizenship as a way to fight communism.72 Home ownership was seen as
anticommunist because it created a “global middle class” and encouraged the prioritization of
private property for the masses.73 Kwak, however, also argues projects funding public housing
and rental assistance often resulted in better outcomes for poor citizens, even if not ideologically
consistent with American foreign policy. 74 American foreign policy, however, did not seem
particularly interested in serving the underprivileged. Instead, these programs aimed to build
American soft power across the world.
Nathan Citino, a Middle Eastern history, concurs with Kwak and believes the creation of
suburbs in Saudi Arabia through the Tapline Home Ownership Program reflects an exportation
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of American values. 75 The Tapline Homeownership Program is essentially the Saudi version of
the exportation of American home ownership. ARAMCO would provide loans to its employees
and other Saudi Arabians to either construct or purchase homes throughout the Eastern Province
of Saudi Arabia.
Critically, Citino suggests company towns or “oil enclaves” as unique sites where the
promotion of American ideals became most crystallized due to the wealth created from the
extraction of oil.76 Citino argues homes could be built in a greater quantity much faster thus
leading to a more dramatic shift from the homeownership in tribal villages to homeownership in
suburban settings. The quicker rate of change, Citino goes on to argue, also leads to more
confrontation.77
Finally, Citino, criticizes the American creation of a Saudi Arabian suburb for a variety of
reasons: policies of racial segregation between Arabs and Americans, results of increasing
economic inequality, and a general inflexiblity to the needs and cultures of the local populace.78
Due to these shortcomings Citino seems to frame ARAMCO’s loan program as a failure of
American policy. Saudi Arabians, particularly the local Eastern Province population, did not
seem interested in American-style homes or homeownership.
Citino and Kwak’s claims are correct in that these programs profited corporations and
failed to create equitable outcomes for Saudi Arabians in the Eastern Province. In Saudi Arabia,
however, questions arise whether or not these were always the intended outcomes for the Saudi
Arabian government and ARAMCO. I argue, in the following section, that housing in the

75

Nathan Citino, “Suburbia and Modernization: Community Building and America’s Post-World War II
Encounter with the Arab Middle East,” The Arab Studies Journal 13, no. 2, (Arab Studies Institute,
Washington DC, 2005) 42.
76
Ibid,. 41.
77
Ibid,. 42.
78
Ibid,. 45.

35

Eastern Province was primarily to sedentarize the population, create a viable labor force, and
establish an imported Sunni elite over the local Shi’i population.
Nevertheless, some of Kwak’s and Citino’s ideas can be applied to Saudi Arabia and
ARAMCO’s Tapline Home Ownership Program. In particular, I agree with Citino that oil
enclaves are an understudied aspect of the exportation of American suburbia. The rapid changes
that occur in company towns helps crystallize some of the cultural clashes that would otherwise
be buried in areas that developed more slowly. In the following section, I display why the
exportation of American middle-class ideals was an outcome that both the Saudi Arabian
government and ARAMCO sought to achieve.
5.4. Background of Home Ownership in the Eastern Province
The Tapline Home Ownership Loan Program was a private initiative created by
ARAMCO in 1951 to combat the increasing number of homeless citizens and poor-quality
homes in Dhahran and Dammam79. These shanty towns were problematic to ARAMCO because
the lack of homes did not incentivize Saudi Arabians to create lasting ties to the community and,
by extension, their jobs at ARAMCO. 80 Modelling itself after American initiatives, ARAMCO
began offering low or no interest loans to Saudi Arabians in order to build permanent dwellings
outside of the American Compound in Dhahran. 81 Construction began on homes in Buqayq (an
oil reserve roughly 40 miles southeast of Dhahran) and Ra’s Tanura (another oil reserve roughly
50 miles north of Dhahran).
By the 1960s, however, the Tapline Home Ownership Loan Program was failing. Saudi
Arabians were not only rejected buying homes, they were declining to even apply for loans.82
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Despite the supposed “superiority” of western homes with running power and appliances, Saudi
Arabians largely refused them. Saudi nonacceptance of American homeownership and loans

Map of Ra’s Tanura and Buqayq83
seem to largely stem from the proposed location of the homes.While there were elements of a
rejection of American cultural values and modernity, it was more a repudiation of relocation. In
particular, the strongest denial of ARAMCO suburbs came from the Baharna people. Shi’i Arabs
refused to move into the suburbs of Buqayq and Ra’s Tanura, citing tribal obligations in their
home villages and a disconnect from their neighbors who came from other parts of Saudi Arabia.
After a series of surveys and reports by scholars working for ARAMCO, the company altered
their program by allowing Saudi Arabians to utilize the loan program to build homes in their
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original villages.84 After this alteration to their loan agreement, the subsequent decade saw an
increase of homes built from around 400 in the 1950s to nearly 7,000 in the 1960s.85
Changes in Saudi Architecture

Image of Hofuf in 1933, Traditional Structures made of mud, used by Saudi Arabians 86

Image of Dhahran, Italian-built stone building in 1940s, intended for Western workers87
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Examples of Homes built before the Tapline Homeownership Program, but with some
more modern materials (i.e. cement) used88

Examples of Homes built through the Tapline Homeownership Program by both Saudi and
Western Workers89
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5.5 Analysis
ARAMCO deemed Shi’i’s unwillingness to move into their suburbs a failure of the
program. For the Saudi Arabian monarchy, however, it was a success. King Abdulaiz favored
and fostered this outcome.90 By encouraging the migration of Saudi Arabians from the rest of the
nation via railway and job opportunities, King Abdulaziz would establish a system which would
create jobs first and foremost for Sunni Arabs. In doing so, Sunni Saudi Arabians would be more
likely to receive home loans and thus “ascend” to homeowners. By creating a Sunni middle
class, he was able to effectively segregate the various ethnicities into classes. Western subjects
and royalty were the richest and most privileged, the Sunni Nejdis came next, and the Baharna
people were the bottom rung of the social and economic ladder.
In the 1950s and 1960s, the Sunni Nejdi workers still did not enjoy the same wealth as
American workers in Dhahran, they still enjoyed far more luxuries than the local Baharna
people. The division of class by ethnicity and purported loyalty reinforced the message
implemented by Saudi Arabian government in the 1930s and before. Those who served the
kingdom would be rewarded with material wealth and those who did not would suffer poverty
and be denied services.
By creating ethnic enclaves, King Abdulaziz and his successors could better monitor
Shi’i Arabs. Rather than trying to distinguish between various types of Saudi Arabians in
Dhahran, the Saudi Arabian government would primarily have to monitor the home villages
where the Shi'a ultimately built their homes. This would allow for a reduction in security forces
in the Eastern Province as there would be fewer areas of concern and potential zones for clashes.
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In doing so, the Saudi Arabian government was able to expand its power in the region with fewer
costs.
Another benefit of the creation of suburbs in Saudi Arabia was the general
sedentarization of the population. Even if the loan program benefitted fewer people than public
housing and rent assistance, as Kwak argues, this program still massively contributed to new
settlements popping up in the Eastern Province. Towns like Ar’ar and similar smaller villages
began crowing and provided settling places for nomadic Saudi Arabians. 91 As more and more
subjects sedentarized, the crown could focus on shifting their focus from military control to
increasing dependence on the government. This shift which began occurring in the late 1960s
blossomed in the 1970s with the nationalization of ARAMCO and the increased number of
Saudis in the oil industry. Education, healthcare, welfare, and other government services became
more important focuses than the threat of a military crackdown.
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6) Policing and Militarization as Control in the Eastern Province
6.1. Introduction
King Abdulaziz’s housing and railway projects increased his power base in the Eastern
Province, the king also used force and military technologies to tighten his control of Dammam.
The Saudi Arabian government essentially had two options for those in the Eastern Province.
They could either make their peace with the Saudi regime and work for ARAMCO or those who
opposed them would face the wrath of Saudi paramilitary forces.
In particular, King Abdulaziz leveraged support from ARAMCO to gain access to aircraft
and armored vehicles. Airplanes and armored vehicles granted King Abdulaziz’s forces an
advantage over their bedouin opposition. Bedouin leaders lost the edge of local knowledge
because Saudi airplanes could easily outmaneuver, assault, and surveil tribal forces. Ultimately,
the presence of air control and other military vehicles crippled external resistance to the Saudi
regime and played a critical role in the forced sedentarization of bedouin groups in the Eastern
Province.
6.2. Origins of Air Power
The origins of Saudi air power largely spring from mutual Saudi and ARAMCO
expansionism. While the Saudi government ultimately desired all of the Arabian peninsula,
ARAMCO specifically wanted the Buraimi Oasis because they believed it contained oil.92 In
1949, ARAMCO crossed out of Saudi Arabian territory and into Oman and Abu Dhabi, violating
British sovereignty. Despite not confirming the presence of oil, Saudi Arabia began making
92

Michael Quentin Morton, Buraimi: The Struggle for Power, Influence, and Oil in Arabia, (London, I.B.
Tauris, 2006) 76.

42

claims on the oasis in 1949, believing they would have the support of not just ARAMCO against
the British, but also the United States government.93 The emergence of the Cold War in 1947,
ensured that the Saudi Arabian government could leverage their oil supplies and strategic value
in exchange for military arms, security agreements, and international support for their war
efforts.94
The Buraimi Dispute emerged from the 1949 territorial claims as British and Saudi
Arabian officials attempted to negotiate borders (see map below) that had never formally been
established due to a Saudi refusal to withdraw claims on what would become the United Arab
Emirates and Oman .95 Despite the London Agreement in 1950 to refrain from sending troops,
Saudi Arabia violated the agreement and occupied the oasis illegally in 1952.96 After a few
skirmishes between Omani-backed soldiers and Saudi troops, the Saudi Arabians were
removed.97 In 1954, Britain and Saudi Arabia agreed to an arbitration agreement where they
would make their territorial claims to an international tribunal.98 In 1955, Britain withdrew from
these negotiations, as Saudi Arabia tried to bribe the judges on the tribunal.99 Finally, the British
resolved the conflict by expelling the Saudi Arabian forces through a mixture of overwhelming
numbers, tactical superiority, and air power.100
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American support for the Buraimi Dispute never came in either conflict or arbitration, the
American government (at the behest of ARAMCO) did grant Saudi Arabia a significant amount
of military arms.These arms included around a dozen planes, enough rifles to equip the 40,000
tribal levies of Saudi Arabia, artillery, and armored vehicles.102 Before the Crisis began, the
United States had Starting with the inclusion of Saudi Arabia in the Lend-Lease Act in 1945,
American small arms, armored vehicles, and other military equipment was either sold or given to
the Saudi Arabian government. 103 Most importantly, following the Lend-Lease Act and the
Mutual Defense Act of 1951, the Saudi Arabian government gained immediate access to air
power, solidifying its power across the country.
6.3 O’Keefe Report
In addition to supplies, the United States government also agreed to prepare a
recommendation for the Saudi military and to share the Dhahran airfield with Saudi Arabia for
the training of pilots and other members of their military in 1951.104 Immediately, the United
States Government surveyed the whole of Saudi Arabia for the purpose of developing a
defensive network centered around Dhahran.105 From this initial survey, the United States
advisors devised a strategy for the Saudi Arabian military. The 1951 military planning document,
known as the O’Keefe Report, would not only shape Saudi Arabia’s offensive and defensive
military doctrine, but more importantly Saudi policing doctrine as well.
The O’Keefe Report, while ostensibly about creating a defensive force for Saudi Arabia,
reflects the anxieties of the American and Saudi government. Both the United States and Saudi
Arabian government feared dissent from within due to regional and tribal loyalties more so than
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an external invasion. In the O’Keefe Report, the United States advisors explicitly recommends a
force that provides for the internal security of Saudi Arabia.106
“In obligating Saudi Arabian defense funds to support the recommended defense
organization, the Saudi Arabian Government should consider that these costs
accomplish a great deal in addition to providing a strong defensive force.
Implementation of the defense organization will not only provide a strong
internal security for the Kingdom, but will contribute to the progress of the
people and the government in improved communications, improved airfields,
construction of many types of facilities such as roads, maintenance shops, etc.,
and above all else, will institute a technical and educational program which will
be available to a large bulk of the Arabian population.” 107
Much like the aforementioned building projects and transportation links, the
Saudi Arabian government saw this as an opportunity to further consolidate their power
by offering both an incentive and a threat to sedentarize in the Eastern Province. This can
be seen in the deployment of the military in the early 1950s against the Shi’i of the
Eastern Province108 While it was the United States military advisors that recommended
this course of action, Saudi Arabia did follow their recommendations and began
implementing changes to the Dhahran Airfield and the surrounding area. The emphasis
on internal security demonstrates that the biggest threat to Saudi authority came from
within rather than from a geopolitical rival like Iran or Egypt.
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In addition, the reports call for the officers to only report to the King and his Ministry of
Defense out of fear of subversion and treason.109
“If the recommended defense organization is to serve its purpose, it must have full
support of its government, financial and otherwise. The defense organization and
its General Staff must be organized in such a manner that it will only be under the
authority of the Minister of Defense and not be subject to the will or the desires of
local Amirs. To accomplish this, the defense organization must be entirely
independent of local Amirs in garrisons, billeting, messing and all supporting
facilities. In other words it must be an instrument of His Majesty and Minister of
Defense and no one else.”
Again, the concern for betrayal and internal strife indicates that the United States military
advisors shared the concerns of the Saudi Arabian government. The Saudi dynasty believed that
the most likely way they would lose power would be from tribal elites rebelling against the
government and either fragmenting or destroying Saudi control of the country entirely. An
external attack, especially from the rest of the British-controlled Gulf was extremely unlikely.
This is largely due to the relationship between the British Empire and the United States. Besides
Saudi Arabia’s natural defense due to its expansive deserts and lack of non-oil resources, the
monarchy had signed a defensive pact with the United States in 1951, effectively blocking any
potential British aggression. The only way, in the eyes of the United States government, to lose
Saudi Arabia was an internal coup or revolution.
In their assessment, the Department of Defense staff recommends Saudi Arabia build a
modern defensive force combining air, naval, and ground forces to protect against potential
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communist invasion. With few belligerent neighbors110, however, the O’Keefe Report and
subsequent State Department documents were primarily worried about internal threats and
coups.111 At the time, Saudi Arabia was surrounded by British-controlled mandates. The British
were more concerned with maintaining the status quo rather than altering the Saudi borders or
clashing for oil. Britain’s informal control of Saudi Arabia began to collapse around 1932
because the British were unable to keep out the United States. The hegemony of Britain over the
Gulf broke when ARAMCO signed their contract and began surveying and prospecting for oil.
At this point, British declension began in the Gulf and ARAMCO, but not necessarily American,
ascendancy began.
Internally, however, the United States perceived Pan-Arabism, nationalism, and
communism as potential security threats. In 1951, the nationalisation of the Anglo-Iranian
Petroleum Company (AIPOC) in Iran would further stoke the American fears. The Iranian
nationalisation would later lead to the Mossadiq Crisis, where the CIA performed a coup against
a perceived communist takeover of the Iranian government. Concerns about instability in Saudi
Arabia were reflected in the report as the advisors focus on the air force’s ability to transport
troops around the country quickly, rather than focusing on Saudi Arabia’s military’s international
offensive capabilities.112
The O’Keefe Report marked a shift in Saudi military and policing doctrine. Rather than
focusing on mobile camel-based cavalry, the United States recommended an air-focused
approach to deal with the difficult terrain of Saudi Arabia. The United States advisors
recommended the Saudi Arabians recruit and maintain 43,000 Saudi Araiban soldiers for their
military. Over a third of the advisors’ recommendation (15,000) were dedicated to the air
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force.113 The United States, and by extension Saudi Arabia, understood to defend and control
such a massive desert country that a significant amount of their armed forces would need to be
part of the air force.
Based on the O’Keefe Report, the American assessment of Saudi threats reflects the
Saudi’s own concerns. Otherwise, why would the Saudi government be so willing to invest
massive amounts of money into training, equipment, and education that would just be sitting
doing nothing? King Abdulaziz recognized the need for quick and overwhelming force anywhere
in the country.
Furthermore, Saudi military forces, particularly air power, were more so a tool of regime
authority rather than an offensive or defensive tool against rival countries.Rather than looking at
Saudi modernization and militarization from a grand geo-political perspective, as other authors
have done in the past, I contend Saudi military doctrine more effectively responds to domestic
governmental and policing needs.
6.4 ARAMCO And Commercial Flight
With the United States military leading the build up of the Saudi Arabian air force,
starting in 1951, ARAMCO also began participating in the creation of Saudi air superiority. On
the surface it may seem like everyday citizens would not be affected or perhaps even aware of
Saudi Arabia’s push for air dominance. After all, how many times would the Saudi Arabian
government do military fly-bys over their own people? Instead, the Saudi Arabian government
needed a way to remind their subjects of Saudi dominance over them.
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By the 1960s, however, planes were a part of many Saudi Arabian’s daily lives. A 1967
article about aviation in ARAMCO World, a company-published magazine written for
employees, shows the ubiquity of aircraft in Saudi Arabia.114
“But[...]for the most part, the passengers and cargo are prosaic, the flights in the
main, routine. They carry high school students to Beirut and Rome, executives to
an oil congress in Baghdad, Government Relations spokesmen to Riyadh or
Jiddah, inspectors along pipelines, exploration men to distant concession areas.”115
By 1967, Saudi Arabia had arranged for daily commuter flights for Saudi Arabian oil
workers.116 These flights transported workers from the Eastern Province (mainly Hofuf and
Abqaiq) to the oil fields bordering Jordan and Iraq in the north. By increasing the presence of
both commercial and military aircraft, the Saudi Arabian government displayed their policing
capabilities to their subjects. The planes not only served as a means to transport people and
supplies cross country, but also as a reminder of the Saudi Arabian government’s watchful eye
over their subjects. Rebellious Saudi subjects, particularly Bedouin tribes that rose up, were
easily dispatched through Saudi air power, such as the Ikwan in the 1930s.117 In the 1970s, this
network of civilian flights would be expanded even further as profits from oil nearly quadrupled
with the oil boom.

Saudi subject’s reliance on transportation by air created further dependency on the crown.
Much like trains, Saudi Arabia could stop or continue flights as they pleased. Saudi subjects
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Example of Commuter Flight from 1960s118
were effectively beholden to the whims of the monarchy. If the workers of Abqaiq and Hofuf
began demonstrating, the Saudi Arabian government could effectively isolate them by ordering
ARAMCO to stop flights in and out of the cities. In the 1950s and 1960s, Saudi Arabia and
ARAMCO created a transportation infrastructure which enabled the Saudi Arabian government
to control the movements of a large portion of their population. While cars became popularized
in Saudi Arabia in the 1950s, they did not become truly dominant until the 1970s after the
monarchy had guaranteed its place at the head of Saudi Arabia.119 The Saudi’s insistence and
continued usage of government-run transportation paid dividends in their authoritarian system.
By investing heavily into air travel (and trains), the Saudi Arabian government became able to
dictate the freedom of movement in their country during the 1950s through 1970s.
6.5 Buraimi Crisis
If the O’Keefe report put forth suggestions on Saudi domestic security policy, the
Buraimi Dispute proved their efficacy. The Buraimi Dispute, while not important on an
international scale, was crucial to the development of Saudi Arabian strength because it
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demonstrated how effective airplanes were in defeating tribal opposition. Eventually, the lessons
learned from the Buraimi Crisis became a crucial part of Saudi Arabian internal security and
policing strategy.
During the Buraimi Crisis, British-backed Oman deployed over fifteen military aircraft
against the Saudi Arabian forces, effectively blocking them from accessing much of the area or
denying supplies to Saudi supporters already in the area. British air superiority showed the Saudi
government air power was essential to controlling the desert in the 20th century. Camels and
ground forces would no longer be able to compete because of the logistical advantages provided
by aircrafts. Saudi Arabia was actually able to take advantage of the logistical advantages for
part of the war as the only way they supplied the occupying force in the oasis was via
ARAMCO-provided aircraft.120 With the knowledge gained from the Buraimi Dispute, Saudi
Arabia confirmed the initial findings of the O’Keefe Report. Any dissident bedouin leaders
would be easily suppressed by air dominance.
Troops could move faster, supplies could be delivered quicker, and the air force could
prevent the enemy from doing the same. Much like the railways, airplanes could act either as a
form of transportation or as a means to deny movement to certain groups. The ability to restrict
movement made air power in Saudi Arabia the most important part of their policing strategy. In
the Eastern Province it enabled the Saudi Arabian government to control their population in a
way no other branch could because they could traverse the inhospitable terrain of the Empty
Quarter in a way no other vehicle or animal could.
Eventually, the threat of aircraft and the promise of jobs became too much for people to
resist and in the 1960s, demographics show that Saudi Arabians were becoming increasingly
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urban and sedentarized.121 The opportunities of the desert could not compete with even the
lower-end jobs in the cities and the possibility of military resistance seemed futile. While Saudi
Arabia is largely sedentarized today, the process really became part of official policy during the
1940s and 1950s. Sedentarization in Saudi Arabia was partially-driven by the Saudi Arabian
government as a means to reign in opposition and expand their own power.
Meanwhile, ARAMCO also encouraged sedentarization because they wanted to shift the
labor pool from rural to urban. ARAMCO needed a cheap and replaceable workforce that could
provide them cheap labor while they extracted as much oil as possible. While eventually, Saudi
workers would completely take control of the facilities in the 1970s, this process was by no
means complete in the 1950s and 1960s, but significant changes to the proportion of bedouins
and urbanites occurred.
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7) Conclusion
Robert Vitalis, regard the 1950s through the 1970s as a period of wasteful spending and
government inefficiency, I show many of Saudi’s so-called “vanity projects” were absolutely
essential in the expansion of Saudi authority and the development of Saudi urban life.122 Rather
than passing over this period of Saudi history as a “lost decade” for development, scholars, like
Anthony Cave Brown, should privilege the period as an important period for establishing
policing, infrastructural, and housing policies that continue to this day.
As my paper demonstrates the creation of railways, suburbs, and a modern military, were
critical to sedentarization oppositional forces to the crown in a way that helped prevent uprisings
and coups against the crown. By refocusing the lens from a global geopolitical viewpoint to a
regional level, the changes made by King Abdulaziz, the Saudi Arabian government, and
ARAMCO all led to greater monarchical authority in the Eastern Province.
Privileging this era’s development and impact allows us to examine modern events with a
different lens, revealing how the Saudi government reuse some of their strategies of the 1950s
and 60s. One example of newly proposed urban developments along the Omani border follows
similar housing and development strategies established in the Eastern Province in the 1950s.123
This new project, called “the Line” project looks to establish control over southern oil fields by
settling cheap labor near the wells. This labor serves the dual purpose of disrupting local
loyalties to Omani politics as well as maintaining a cost-efficient oil field. These settlers will also
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provide a deterrent to attacks on the newly-claimed oil wells. While the new urban developments
are more aggressive than the 1950s settlement, the parallels in extending Saudi authority are
evident.
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